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Abstract 
 
This paper describes a systems ergonomics analysis of the recent outbreaks of 
Clostridium difficile which occurred over the period 2005-07 within the UK 
Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells NHS Trust. The analysis used documents related to 
the outbreak, alongside the construction of a system model in order to probe deeper 
into the nature of contributory factors within the Trust. The findings from the analysis 
demonstrate the value of looking further at cross-level and whole-system aspects of 
infection outbreaks. In particular there is a need for further study of the causal 
relationships that exist between hospital management and clinical management levels 
within the system. Finally, the paper discusses ways forward and strategies that could 
adopted in order to limit the outbreak of hospital-related infections and shape future 
research.  
 
 
Statement of Relevance for Ergonomics Practice 
 
The approach used for the system analysis described in the paper could be used by 
health care practitioners and ergonomists to probe deeper into the causes of infection 
outbreaks and to extend the scope of interventions aimed at preventing their 
occurrence.  
 
 
 
Keywords 
 
Health Care Ergonomics; Complex Systems; Sociotechnical Systems; Work 
Organisation; Organisational Change 
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1. Infection control and systems  
The subject of hospital infection control and prevention has recently become the subject 
of much media attention in the UK (The Guardian, 2007; BBC Panorama, 2008). A 
number of high profile hospital outbreaks within the UK involving bacterium such as 
Clostridium difficile (C. diff.) and MRSA (Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus 
aureus) have raised infection control into a central priority for the UK NHS and other 
health care systems worldwide (Allegranzi et al., 2007). Much of the debate so far has 
concentrated on improving hygiene within hospitals (e.g., hand washing, deep 
cleaning), very little research has been conducted on the wider behavioural, social and 
organisational factors that may also determine infection control outbreaks (Griffiths, 
Renz and Rafferty, 2008). Hospitals are complex sociotechnical systems, spanning a 
range of technologies (e.g., medical devices, electronic records), actors (e.g., clinicians, 
health care professionals) and aspects of physical design (e.g., wards and operating 
theatres) (van Maanen and Barley, 1985). Within systems ergonomics Rasmussen 
(1997) has provided a modelling framework for understanding the dynamic interaction 
between these types of components within a large-scale sociotechnical system. The 
framework consists of two main components: a structural hierarchy describing the 
various actors; and, contextual factors influencing the activities of the actors (figure 1).  
 
 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
 
 
Vicente and Christoffersen (2006) have used the modelling framework to identify the 
lessons learnt from the May 2000 outbreak of E. coli which occurred in Walkerton, 
Canada. Their analysis identified a set of contributing factors that led up to the 
Walkerton outbreak. These included decisions made at governmental levels (e.g., 
privatisation initiatives), the action of actors within the system (e.g., failures to take 
water samples), as well as equipment failures (e.g., shallow water wells). 
 
The aim of the present paper is to examine in detail an example of a series of infection 
outbreaks as they occurred within a complex sociotechnical system from the 
Page 3 of 25
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/terg E-mail: ergonomics@tandf.co.uk
Ergonomics
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
perspective of systems ergonomics. The example is drawn from the outbreak of the 
bacterium Clostridium difficile which occurred between 2005 and 2007 in the 
Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells NHS Trust. In particular, the paper aims to address 
the following objectives: 
 
• To explore the potential of using systems ergonomics in order to analyse and 
explain the causes of the outbreaks; 
• To consider the relationships that exist within and between system levels and 
use these to suggest new ways of examining causal dependencies and 
linkages;  
• To consider the implications of a systems analysis in terms of 
recommendations for future research and practice within infection control.   
 
In section 2 the methodology and steps used to analyse the outbreaks and perform the 
systems analysis are described. Section 3 describes the background to the outbreak 
alongside a set of contributory factors that have been highlighted in the report 
produced by the UK Healthcare Commission in 2007. Section 4 of the paper describe 
the outcomes of the systems ergonomic analysis. The final section (section 4) 
describes strategies that could be used in order to help prevent further outbreaks 
occurring, and discusses the findings within the context of previous and  future 
research within infection control.  
 
2. Methodology  
Very few explicit guidelines exist for carrying out systems analyses within human 
factors and ergonomics. Rather than fixed or definitive methods of analysis, 
researchers have in the past adopted a number of methods and techniques, often in 
parallel (e.g., Singleton et al., 1967; Optner,1973; Beishon and Peters, 1976). More 
recently, researchers have often used their own methodologies, conceptual 
frameworks and approaches to analyses complex systems (e.g., the STAMP approach 
– Leveson et al., 2009; the various methods described by Hollnagel et al., 2006 in 
their description resilience engineering). In this paper the following procedure and 
steps were used for carrying out the systems analysis and covered an initial phases of 
system description followed by analysis: 
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System description 
(1) Document analysis – this involved reading the various reports that have been 
written concerning recent infection outbreaks in the UK NHS. The main focus 
was on the Health Commission’s main report published in 2007, but also 
involved consultation of other relevant documents (e.g., Healthcare 
Commission, 2006, 2008).  The analysis took the form of summarising the 
main contributory factors leading up to the outbreak at Maidstone and 
Tunbridge Wells. In particular, examples of human and organisational factors 
covering a range of system-related dimensions were extracted from the report 
(e.g., relationships between external organisations, management, group and 
individual behaviour, workplace design and equipment). 
(2) Construction of a timeline of events – based upon the 2007 report the main 
events leading up to the outbreaks were summarised (table 1). 
System analysis 
(3) System modelling – this involved mapping the contributory factors onto a 
systems framework, in this case the risk management framework described by 
Rasmussen (1997). The mapping task also involved modifying the risk 
management in order to fit the specific details of the outbreak and coverage of 
the main system components (see figures 2 a, b and c). 
(4) The final stage of the analysis involved examining the resulting system model 
in order to propose possible causal linkages and relationships between specific 
system levels (e.g., hospital management and clinical management levels), as 
well as links and relationships which may have applied to the system as a 
whole. 
 
3. System description of the Clostridium difficile outbreak in the Maidstone and 
Tunbridge Wells NHS Trust  
 
The description and analysis of the outbreak is primarily based upon the report 
produced by the Healthcare Commission (HC) (2007). In addition, other sources of 
documentary information concerning the outbreak were consulted, these included 
previous reports of outbreaks (e.g., Healthcare Commission, 2006), as well as other 
literature within the area of health care-related infection control (e.g., National Audit 
Office, 2000; Duerden, 2008; Healthcare Commission, 2008). 
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3.1 Background to the outbreak and timeline 
During the period between April 2004 and September 2006 an estimated 90 people 
died at the Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells NHS Trust as a result of becoming 
infected with the Clostridium difficile (C.diff.) bacteria (Healthcare Commission, 
2007, p.5). C. diff. is the major cause of serious bacterial infectious diarrhoea acquired 
in hospitals in the UK and is particularly resistant to drying, chemical disinfectants 
and alcohol. The number of cases of C. difficile and reported deaths has increased 
within the UK in the last few years and similar outbreaks have occurred at other 
hospitals (e.g., Stoke Mandeville – Healthcare Commission, 2006).  
Recommendations for the prevention of the spread of the bacteria include: the timely 
isolation of known and suspected cases; the control of antibiotics; the application of 
high standards of hygiene; and, the restriction of the movements of patients. The main 
events at the Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells NHS Trust are summarised in table 1.  
 
 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
 
 
3.2  Report findings: summary of contributory factors  
The Healthcare Commission (2007) (HC, 2007) report identified a number of factors 
that contributed to the outbreaks that occurred with the trust. The following sections 
present a selection of the main findings from the report. 
 
3.2.1 The role of external organisations 
The external body responsible for the National Health Service as a whole is the UK 
government. Aside from developing overall NHS strategy and policy, the government 
is also responsible for allocating budgets and setting financial and service level targets 
(e.g., maximum waiting times for operations, hospital stays). Within the report both 
the setting of targets and financial pressures on NHS trusts are mentioned as 
background, contributory factors that had an impact on the day-to-day operation of 
the Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells trust. In particular, the report mentions the need 
for trust board members and managers to meet throughout targets for the use of beds. 
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Higher bed occupancy meant that there was less time for the cleaning and a higher 
probability of transmission of infection between patients (HC, 2007, pp.69-70).  The 
need to meet financial targets such as spending on equipment and buildings also 
placed pressure on the trust to cut back in areas that impacted upon infection control 
such as financing for new buildings and isolation areas. The issue of finance and 
targets were singled out in the report as one common factor in both the Maidstone and 
Tunbridge Wells and Stoke Mandeville (Healthcare Commission, 2006) infection 
outbreaks. 
 
Aside from the government infection control within the UK NHS is regulated by a 
number of other bodies.  The creation of the Health Protection Agency (HPA) in April 
2005 coincided with the first outbreak at the trust. The remit of the HPA is to provide 
advice and support to NHS, local authorities and other agencies with regard to public 
health issues. One part of the HPA, the health protection unit (HPU), is to support 
organisations in their management of infections. The report highlights that this caused 
some confusion within the trust at the time of the outbreaks as the expectation was 
that the HPU could give provide guidance covering the supervision and monitoring of 
infection control. Similar problems were encountered within the much larger Strategic 
Health Authority (SHA), the report mentions that until recently the SHA were more 
focused on outbreaks of other healthcare associated infections (e.g., MRSA), partly 
because these were at the time of the outbreaks one of the national priority to which 
performance targets were attached. 
 
3.2.2 Management of the trust 
The report describes a catalogue of problems and failures associated with the 
management of the trust at the time of the outbreaks. In addition, other factors 
contributed to the problems faced by managers and trust board members, these 
included high turnover of senior managers over the period of the outbreaks and a 
management style that was described in the report as “reactive, with frequent changes 
of direction” (HC, 2007, p. 8).  
 
In terms of clinical risks and incidents, the report describes how management strategy 
in general “had been fragmentary and poorly understood” (HC, 2007, p. 77). In March 
2003 the Department of Health issued guidance on constructing a risk assurance 
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framework, part of which involved reducing hospital-based infections. Despite this no 
mention was made of C. diff. infections until 2006/7 (HC, 2007, p. 77). Similar 
problems applied to systems in place that were designed to learn about and respond to 
clinical incidents. The reports from an internal group set up within the trust in order to 
analyse complaints, claims and incidents highlight, amongst others, the following 
issues:   the unsatisfactory nature of some “escalation” areas (areas temporarily set up 
to deal with infected patients), areas which were opened to take admissions; the effect 
the accident and emergency (A&E) target had on the quality of care; poor quality 
handover and transfer to wards from A&E; concerns about staffing levels, and bank 
staff managing wards on some shifts. 
 
The style of leadership within the trust and the overall management culture were 
criticised in the report. Many staff described the leadership of the chief executive as 
being “autocratic” or “dictatorial” (HC, 2007 p. 91). The report concluded that the 
person appointed as director of infection prevention and control had “no real 
understanding of the role at the outset” (HC, 2007, p. 5). Turnover of managers and 
directors was high. Between September 2002 and September 2006 five people 
attended the board in five roles as director or director of finance (HC, 2007, p. 91). 
Despite weekly meetings the report concludes that there was little evidence of 
managers working collaboratively to address problems (HC, 2007, p. 91). Managers 
were often under considerable stress and in fear of losing their jobs (HC, 2007, p. 92). 
Likewise most staff were afraid to speak out and raise concerns about what was 
happening within the trust.  
 
Amongst staff, as well as some of those in senior positions within the trust, the 
overwhelming priority of senior managers was seen to be finance and the need to 
meet national targets (e.g., A&E targets). Financial restrictions placed a heavy burden 
upon levels of bed occupancy, staffing levels and the availability of equipment (HC, 
2007, p. 93). The need to satisfy targets was seen as the primary reason why patients 
were moved around so often, thereby increasing the risk of infections spreading. In 
addition, poor handover between wards worsened the situation. 
 
Finally, the trust’s management of staffing is criticised heavily within the report in 
several places. The number of nurses working on wards had fallen since the period 
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2002/03. and at the same time the number of beds had also reduced. In 2006/07 the 
number of nurse per bed was 1.52, the same number as in 2003/04 (HC, 2007, p. 82). 
trust managers had not carried out a comprehensive review of staffing levels or a 
determination of minimum staffing levels. Although the board noted in September 
2006 that low staffing numbers posed a risk when managing highly-dependent 
patients with C. diff., they had a not earlier analysed poor care in relation to staffing 
levels to see if there was a connection (HC, 2007, p. 83). 
 
3.2.3 Clinical management on the hospital wards 
A review of the case notes of 50 patients who had died having had C. diff. found that 
in 80% of the case, at least one element of the clinical management, or monitoring of 
C. diff at ward level was unsatisfactory (HC, 2007, p. 4). A number of elements are 
mentioned, including: infrequent reviews of patients by doctors; lack of systematic 
monitoring as to whether or not a patient was recovering from C. diff; and, failure to 
change antibiotic treatment when a patient failed to respond to the initial treatment 
(HC, 2007, p. 4). Delays in starting treatment occurred on the wards, mostly because 
there was a delay in sending samples for analysis (HC, 2007, p. 33). The report found 
that there was little evidence that once C. diff. had been diagnosed that patients were 
monitored for severe signs of the infection (HC, 2007, p. 34). In other cases, it was 
clear that diagnoses were either not considered or had been missed. In 34% of the 
cases reviewed, medical records did not indicate that a regular review of C. diff had 
taken place (HC, 2007, p. 38). The management of fluids and nutrition on the wards 
was also inconsistent. In 36% of the case reviewed there was evidence of poor fluid 
management and in 34% nutritional needs had not been assessed or managed (HC, 
2007, p. 38).  
 
3.2.4 The infection control team 
The role played by the infection control team within the trust was a complex one and 
one made difficult by problems relating to accountability, the amount of resources 
available to them and their ability to function as a team. The arrangements for 
accountability were not clear (HC, 2007, p. 54). Infection control nurses were 
accountable to the director of nursing, the pathology manager held the budget for 
these nurses, but did not consider that he had any management responsibly for 
infection control. Similarly, the clinical director of pathology was not aware of any 
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responsibility for infection control. The person in charge of budgets for pathology, the 
director of operations, did not consider that he had management responsibility for the 
team. Not until September 2006 did the trust take steps to clarify the management of 
the team (HC, 2007, p. 51). 
 
The resources available to the team were limited. It was noted in November 2003 that 
the team was understaffed with one team having to cover all three hospitals in the 
trust (HC, 2007, p. 51).  Inevitably, the team was overstretched and at times this mean 
that they fell behind on their audit work. Absences due to annual leave and sick leave 
were not always compensated through the use of locum cover. The degree to which 
the infection control team worked well together and functioned as  a team is criticised 
in the report (HC, 2007, pp. 53-54). The microbiologists in the team were seen as 
helpful by staff, but not natural leaders or champions for infection control. They did 
not regularly visit wards and were hard to contact. In addition, the advice they gave 
was often conflicting and inconsistent. The infection control nurses by contrast, 
visited ward regularly and tended to act as a link between ward staff and 
microbiologists. However, the report also notes that working relationships between 
nurses and microbiologists were not always close or supportive. Meetings of the 
infection control committee were infrequent and clinical staff such as senior nurses 
and consultants were often not present at the meetings (HC, 2007, p. 54). 
 
3.2.5 Equipment and hygiene 
Hygiene practices within the trust and the state of hospital buildings contributed a 
great deal to the outbreaks. Wards, bathrooms and commodes were not clean and 
patients had in some cases to share equipment (e.g., Zimmer frames) which were not 
cleaned before use (HC, 2007, p. 4). The infection control team were keen to isolate 
patients once they had been identified as C. diff. cases, however the scarcity of side 
rooms made this difficult. As a result many patients before and after the outbreaks were 
kept on open wards. The design of buildings and their age meant that many wards did 
not have sufficient space for storage or the provision of hand basins in utility rooms. 
The buildings in the trust were generally old or in a poor state of repair and when they 
were first opened did not have adequate cleaning and laundry services (HC, 2007, p. 6). 
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4.  Systems analysis of the outbreaks  
In common with most examples of accidents, disasters or large-scale adverse events, the 
outbreaks can be interpreted as arising through the combination of a number of 
interrelated systemic factors and influences (Turner, 1978; Reason, 1995). Figure 2 (a) 
attempts to use some of the elements of Rasmussen’s (1997) risk management 
framework in order to further analyse the outbreaks. In order to illustrate the framework 
as it applies to the outbreaks, a sample of the contributory factors are used to link 
together some  of the system components. 
 
  
 
Figure 2 (a)  here 
 
 
 
The upper or macro-levels of the system in figure 2 (a) (government, regulatory, trust 
governance), can be regarded as representing institutional and organisational influences 
on the system as a whole. Similarly, lower or micro-levels (e.g., hospital and clinical 
management, equipment and buildings), represent influences arising through the day-to-
day work of staff and the environment in which they worked.  One way in which the 
outbreaks can be explained is to analyse in further detail the relationships and 
contributory factors that exist across macro- and micro-levels system levels (Genaidy et 
al., 2008). Within the field of organisational behaviour, Hackman (2003) has suggested 
that researchers adopt the strategy of crossing levels, using what he terms “bracketing” -  
analysing constructs or influencing factors that exist in two or more system levels. 
Within ergonomics, Karsh (2006) has advocated something similar in his use of the 
term “mesoergonomics” which he defines as “an open system approach to the 
development of macroergonomic theory and research whereby the relationship between 
variables in at least two different levels or echelons are studied” (p. 3). Finally, House et 
al., (1995) suggest that so-called “meso-level” analyses should also address the issue of 
“isomorphic” constructs within the system. These types of constructs involve analysing 
the whole system in order to assess: “the degree to which the constituent components of 
a phenomenon and the relationships among the components are similar across levels of 
analysis” (House et al., 1995, p. 87). 
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4.1 Cross-level relationships 
A summary of some of the possible cross-level relationships that contributed to the 
outbreaks are shown in figure 2 (b). 
 
 
Figure 2 (b) here 
 
 
 
At the regulatory, trust governance and hospital management levels of the system, bed-
occupancy and other targets placed many individuals under a great deal of pressure. 
This pressure in itself may have led them to make poor decisions, and in some cases to 
prioritise bed occupancy rates at the expense of the risk of an infection outbreak.  
Previous research on the influence of targets on management decision-making in health 
care tends to be equivocal. Bean and Hood (2006) for example, show that the impact of 
satisfying a specific target (e.g., hospital waiting times) has not been analysed in terms 
of how this influences other related services (e.g., quality of care). Within the trust it is 
likely that targets exerted considerable pressure on the system as a whole and this 
pressure filtered down various levels of the system. It is possible that the drive to 
comply with these targets increased the likelihood of an adverse event or set of events 
taking place at some stage within the trust (West, 2000). 
 
A separate report by the Healthcare Commission (2008) examined the underlying 
causes of serious failures in NHS health care providers and identified large-scale 
organisational processes such as mergers and poor change management procedures as 
common factors. The outbreaks within Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells, as well as the 
earlier outbreak at Stoke Mandeville Hospital (Healthcare Commission, 2006), took 
place against the background of large-scale organisational mergers.  Previous research 
on the impact of mergers on employees has shown that decreased employee motivation 
and higher staff turnover are frequent outcomes (Cartwright and Cooper, 1993), 
alongside poorer organisational performance and productivity (Kiessling, Harvey and 
Heames, 2008). 
 
In terms of the overlap between hospital and clinical Management system levels it is 
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clear that the actions of senior managers were identified as significantly contributing to 
the failure to prevent and deal with the outbreaks. The link between management, 
human resource management (HRM) practices and work performance outcomes has 
been investigated in detail in the last few years. Wood and Wall (2002) for example, 
reviewed evidence that suggests there is a link between high-involvement HRM 
practices and employee productivity. High involvement HRM practices typically 
include empowering employees to make their own decisions and the presence of self-
managed teams. The review showed that there these types of practices in organisations 
do tend to increase levels of employee productivity. Similar effects have been shown 
between HRM practices and measurements of safety outcomes (e.g., number of adverse 
events). In general, there is strong evidence to suggest that aspects of management 
behaviour partially shape and determine the culture of safety within organisations (e.g., 
Zohar, 2000). Within health care specifically, West et al. (2002) carried out a large-
scale survey of the relationship between HRM practices and general in-hospital 
mortality. The survey showed some aspect of high involvement HRM were associated 
with lower mortality rates after adjustment for patient and hospital characteristics. 
 
With regard to the interaction between clinical management and equipment and 
buildings system levels, the report identifies understaffing and general lack of 
resources, both human and in terms of equipment, as playing a major part in the 
outbreaks. Staffing ratios, levels of staff morale and inadequate facilities almost 
certainly contributed to the problem of containing the spread of infection on the wards. 
In general, the research literature provides some evidence that lower levels of staffing 
increase the likelihood of infections occurring. Hugonnet et al. (2004) examined the 
numbers of nursing staff and staff downsizing relative to infection levels. The 
researchers found an inverse relationship between staff downsizing and the rate of 
hospital-based infection. Little research has been conducted on the impact of job 
satisfaction/morale on hospital infection levels, however, work in other domains (e.g., 
manufacturing and service industries) suggests that lower levels of satisfaction are 
clearly linked to lower levels of job performance, as well as being influenced by other 
environmental factors  (Parker and Wall, 1998). 
 
4.2 Whole system relationships 
The nature and patterns of decision-making and the capacity for organisational learning 
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within the trust might be singled out as potential “isomorphic” constructs that 
influenced the outbreaks and the way in which they were subsequently managed – 
figure 2 (c). 
 
 
Figure 2 (c)  here 
 
 
Aside from the way in which senior managers behaved at the trust, the questions still 
remains as to why they ignored, or at least failed to realise the seriousness of the 
outbreaks and their consequences. Many of the managers interviewed in the original 
Healthcare Commission report reported that they were aware of how serious the 
situation had become within the trust, but were powerless to do anything about it. One 
possible explanation is what Vaughan (1996) in her study of the Challenger shuttle 
disaster termed the “normalization of deviance”; namely, that managers over time 
began to accept and take for granted the level of infection risk within the trust. Only 
after the level of risk built up to a point where it was effectively out of control, did they 
begin to realise the gravity of the situation. 
 
It might be conjectured that the behaviour of clinicians and other health care 
professionals across other system levels shares similarities with those of senior 
managers and trust board managers. Many individuals at ward level were aware of the 
levels of poor hygiene and inadequate patient monitoring practices, but saw no way to 
improve the situation. Weick and Sutcliffe (2003) analysed data from the Bristol 
Royal Infirmary Report (Department of Health, 2001) and concluded that hospital 
staff became locked into particular lines of action or behaviour where they “search for 
confirmation that they are doing what they should be doing” (p. 73). These so-called 
“cultures of entrapment” inhibit an organisation’s ability to break out of patterns of 
behaviour that over time can lead to adverse outcomes. Other researchers have 
suggested that in such cases individuals fall into the trap of routinely carrying out 
their work without challenging assumptions or questioning the consequences of what 
they are doing (“involuntary automaticity” - Toft and Mascie-Taylor, 2005)  In such 
cases organisational learning throughout the system is inhibited and the ability to 
adapt and learn from failure results in patterns of negative reinforcement which, in 
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turn,  act as a barrier to change (Tucker and Edmondson, 2003).  
 
 
5. Discussion and future research  
The analysis presented in the paper has shown that there are advantages in analysing  
hospital-based infection outbreaks from a system’s perspective. Many of the issues that 
have been discussed have not been researched within the patient safety literature in 
much depth, particularly organisational phenomena (Waterson, 2008).  The use of a 
systems ergon mics analysis facilitates a consideration of a wide range of issues which 
go beyond the current focus on individual levels of analysis (e.g., behavioural 
interventions in the form of hand washing campaigns). There is a need for much further 
investigation of the social, organisational and managerial aspects of infection outbreaks 
(Cole, 2008; Griffiths, Renz and Rafferty, 2008). Future research should, for example, 
establish the extent that management culture and behaviour have upon infection 
outbreaks. This work needs to carried out in tandem with evaluations of the impact of 
other initiatives that target other system levels (e.g., health care professionals and 
infection control teams). Without such studies there is a danger that researchers and 
practitioners gain at best a partial view, with the added result that the design of 
appropriate interventions will result in partial success, or at worse fail to achieve their 
objectives. 
 
The process of identifying cross-level and whole-system provides a conceptual frame of 
reference that could serve as the basis for more focused empirical studies. In particular, 
future work should aim to follow the trend of recent work in organisational behaviour 
of using multi-level modelling techniques to unpick cross system (meso-) level 
relationships. This trend shows some promise and has already been used within health 
care ergonomics to understand the causes of medical errors (Karsh and Brown, in press) 
and factors determining the acceptance of electronic medical record systems 
(Greenhalgh et al., 2008). In addition, the analysis presented within the paper could be 
compared and contrasted with alternative models within systems ergonomics (e.g., 
resilience engineering). This could be achieved, for example, by building simulated 
computer models of infection control practices and comparing the results from models 
with hospital-derived data (Brailsford and Schmidt, 2003; Leveson et al., 2006). 
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Table 1: Summary timeline of infection outbreaks at Maidstone and Tunbridge 
Wells NHS Trust 
 
Time Period Event 
April 2000 Trust established following merger between two other local NHS Trusts 
2001/2-2005 High turnover of senior managers and period of organisational stability 
(HC, 7) 
October 2005 - 
September 2006 
More than 500 patients developed the infection, 60 patients estimated to 
have died due to C. difficile infection. 
Before 2005 Trust has a high level of infection with C. difficile but no one in the trust 
or local health authority was aware of this 
Autumn 2005 Number of patients infected doubles. Approximately 150 patients 
affected, a number of whom died as a result of the infection. (first 
outbreak – 7) 
April – September 2006 258 patients in total affected 
Beginning 2006 Number of newly infected patients declines. 
April 2006 Trust recognises it has a major outbreak and reports this to strategic 
health authority and health protection unit. (second outbreak – 7) 
April 2007 Healthcare Commission finds unacceptable examples of the use of 
contaminated equipment (HC 8) 
October 2007 Healthcare Commission Report published. 
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Figure 1: Rasmussen’s (1997) model of risk management within sociotechnical 
systems  
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Figure 2 (a): Systems framework and outbreak contributory factors  
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Figure 2 (b): System cross-level relationships  
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Figure 2 (c): Whole system relationships 
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